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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Adam Jon Barth appeals from the district court's order revoking probation and 
executing the sentence previously imposed upon Barth's conviction for felony injury 
to child. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2012, 14-year old M.C. disclosed to authorities that she had been involved 
in a dating relationship with 21-year old Barth. (R., pp.13-17.) The relationship 
started after Barth met M.C. and told her that he was 16 years old. (R., p.17.) M.C. 
told authorities that in the course of the relationship, Barth touched her buttocks and 
breasts, and solicited her to have sex with him on two occasions. (R., pp.20-21.) 
M.C. also reported that, upon Barth's request, she sent him a photo of herself in her 
underwear, and that Barth sent a photo of his penis to her. (R., p.17.) 
The state charged Barth with two counts of sexual abuse of a child under 16. 
(R, pp.59-61.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barth pleaded guilty to an amended 
charge of felony injury to child. (R., pp.81-95.) A psychosexual evaluation 
conducted on Barth prior to sentencing concluded that Barth was a high risk to re-
offend, and that he was not amendable to sexual offender treatment. (PSI, pp.53-
54.1) Barth reported to the presentence investigator that he had been diagnosed 
with "bipolar disorder, PTSD, possible head injury, and ADHD." (PSI, p.74.) The 
1 "PSI" page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Supreme Court No. 42703 Adam Barth Confidential 1Ex_hibits." This file contains 
Barth's PSI, as well as various evaluations and other exhibits submitted by the 
parties during the course of the underlying criminal proceedings. 
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presentence investigator opined that Barth was "not a candidate for probation at this 
time." (PSI, p.77.) The district court imposed a unified six-year sentence with two 
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.113-119.) 
A rider report submitted to the court by the Idaho Department of Correction 
stated that Barth was "not capable of doing the abstract thinking required to make 
progress" in the sex offender treatment program. (PSI, p.171.) The report also 
described numerous disciplinary sanctions Barth received, and concluded that Barth 
would be "unmanageable on probation." (PSI, pp.174-177.) At the conclusion of the 
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the originally-imposed 
sentence and placed Barth on probation for five years. (R, pp.132-135.) As a 
special condition of probation, the court ordered that Barth be transported to the 
custody of the Safe Haven living facility in Blackfoot. (Id.) 
Approximately two months later, the state filed a report of probation violation 
alleging that Barth violated his probation by being evicted from the Safe Haven 
facility for failing to follow facility rules. (R., pp.146-150.) Barth admitted violating 
his probation in the manner alleged by the state, and the district court revoked and 
reinstated Barth's probation. (R., pp.177-183.) The district court further ordered that 
Barth's residence would be determined by Barth's probation officer. (R., p.180.) 
Approximately three months later, the state filed another report of probation 
violation. (R., pp.184-194.) The state alleged that Barth violated his probation by: 
(1) possessing a pipe with a burnt residue and a baggie containing a green leafy 
substance, both of which tested positive for synthetic cannabis, (2) being discharged 
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from required sex offender treatment for inappropriately touching a staff member; 
and (3) possessing a knife in his living facility. (Id.) 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Barth admitted violating his probation by 
possessing synthetic cannabis. (6/24/14 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.8.) At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Barth also violated 
his probation by being discharged from sex offender treatment for engaging in 
inappropriate conduct. (6/24/14 Tr., p.60, L.14- p.66, L.17.) The district court found 
that the state failed to prove that Barth possessed a knife in violation of his 
probation. (6/24/14 Tr., p.60, Ls.4-12.) 
Prior to disposition, the district court granted Barth's request that he be 
ordered to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation. (6/24/14 Tr., p.66, L.22 - p.72, 
L.18; R., pp.244-245.) The neuropsychological evaluator concluded that Barth's 
psychological issues were likely not caused by a head injury, but instead were 
"predominantly a combination of his neurodevelopmental issues (Asperger's 
spectrum) combined with his psychiatric issues that combine to create significant 
deficits in his reasoning and problem solving." (PSI, pp.328-329.) Also prior to the 
disposition hearing, the state submitted numerous disciplinary reports documenting 
Barth's continued violations of inmate rules committed while he was incarcerated 
following his arrest on the probation violation. (PSI, pp.215-315, 340-381.) 
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the district court revoked Barth's 
probation and ordered the originally imposed sentence to be executed. (R., pp.253-
257; 10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.10 - p.102, L.7.) The district court later denied Barth's 
3 




Barth states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred by applying the wrong standard 
during its evaluation of Mr. Barth's claim that one of the alleged 
probation violations was not willful. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it decided 
it did not have the authority to tailor the terms of probation to Mr. 
Barth's individual needs. 
(Appellant's brief, p.13) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Barth failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation? 
2. Has Barth failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 




Barth Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking 
His Probation 
A. Introduction 
Barth contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his 
probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-22.) Specifically, Barth contends that the district 
court erred by: (1) applying an outdated legal standard, rather than I.C.R. 33(f), to 
determine whether it could revoke Barth's probation regardless of whether his 
probation violations were willful; and (2) failing to recognize the scope of its 
discretion to tailor the terms of probation to meet Barth's individual needs. (Id.) 
Barth's claims fail because a review of the record reveals that the district court acted 
well within its discretion in revoking Barth's probation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Drennen, 
122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992). "When a trial court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-
tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(1989). 
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"[A] district court's finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if 
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding." State v. Sanchez, 
149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). An appellate court will accept the 
district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but "may freely 
review the district court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts 
found." kl at 104, 233 P.3d at 35 (citations omitted). 
"The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by analogy, 
court rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free review." 
Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion With Respect To The 
Probation Violation Allegation That Barth Was Discharged From Sex Offender 
Treatment 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,325,834 P.2d 326,327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,115 
Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989). When deciding whether to 
revoke probation, the district court must consider "whether the probation [was] 
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of 
society." Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1022, 842 P.2d 698, 701. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f)2 provides, in relevant part: 
2 Effective July 31, 2015, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was renumbered as I.C.R. 33(f). 
This amendment did not change the language of this subsection, which was 
substantively amended in 2012. See 4/23/14 Order "In Re: Amendment of Idaho 
Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 33." 
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The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the 
defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of probation. 
Therefore, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a district court of its 
authority to revoke a defendant's probation unless the court finds that the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of his probation. Prior to the 2012 amendment to this 
rule which added this requirement, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that where a 
defendant's probation violations were not willful, a district court could still chose to 
revoke probation, but only after first considering "whether adequate alternative 
methods of punishing the defendant [were] available." State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 
378, 381-383, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340-1342 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 
461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983)). 
In this case, the state's second report of probation violation alleged that Barth 
violated his probation by: (1) possessing a pipe with a burnt residue and a baggie 
containing a green leafy substance, both of which tested positive for synthetic 
cannabis; (2) being discharged from required sex offender treatment for 
inappropriately touching a staff member; and (3) possessing a knife in his living 
facility. (R., pp.184-194.) On appeal, Barth contends that the district court erred by 
failing to apply I.C.R. 33(f) with respect to the second allegation pertaining to his 
discharge from sex offender treatment, and by instead applying the standard from 
Lafferty. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-22.) 
Barth's claim fails for several reasons. First, Barth's claim that the district 
court erred with respect to the second probation violation allegation is moot because 
Barth admitted committing a willful probation violation with respect to the first 
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probation violation allegation, that he possessed synthetic cannabis. Because Barth 
made this admission, the district court had authority to revoke his probation pursuant 
to 1.C.R. 33(f) notwithstanding the district court's disposition of his second probation 
violation allegation. Second, while the district court did not expressly conclude 
whether Barth's discharge from sex offender treatment constituted a willful probation 
violation, a review of the record reveals substantial evidence that the discharge was 
based upon Barth's own willful conduct. Thus, this second violation also justified the 
district court's revocation of probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f). Finally, even if 
Barth's probation violations were not willful, Barth is still not entitled to relief because 
the district court had authority under a number of statutes to revoke Barth's 
probation, regardless of whether the violations were willful. 
1. Barth's Challenge To The District Court's Determinations Regarding 
His Discharge From Sex Offender Treatment Is Moot 
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." State v. Barclay, 
149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). The mootness doctrine 
precludes review when "the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. 
Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting 
Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). 
When considering whether a probation violation was willful, the Idaho 
appellate courts review the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists 
to show a willful violation. See, M.,., State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 
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1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 530-531, 20 P.3d 709, 
714-715 (Ct. App. 2001); Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 381,870 P.2d at 1340. 
In this case, notwithstanding the district court's disposition of the probation 
violation allegation relating to Barth's discharge from sex offender treatment, the 
court was entitled to revoke Barth's probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f) because Barth 
admitted committing a willful probation violation with respect to the first probation 
violation allegation, that Barth possessed synthetic cannabis. Prior to the 








All right, then, sir. To the allegation in Count I, that 
you violated agreement of supervision rule number 
nine, on or about March 31, 2014, by possessing a 
pipe with a green leafy substance that tested positive 
for Spice, do you admit or deny that allegation? 
I admit to it. 
And are the allegations correct that you did indeed 
possess a pipe with that substance that tested for 
Spice? 
I did. 
And were you aware of the agreement of supervision 
number nine, rule number nine, that required that you 
not be in possession of such substances or 
paraphernalia while on probation? 
I do. 
(6/24/14 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.12.) 
Additionally, in support of its report of probation violation, the state submitted 
a probable cause affidavit which indicated that Barth told the officer who recovered 
the pipe and synthetic cannabis that he knew of the nature of the substance and had 
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previously smoked it. (R., pp.186-191.) Barth has not alleged, either below or on 
appeal, that his possession of the pipe and the synthetic cannabis did not constitute 
a willful probation violation. Because Barth willfully violated his probation by 
possessing synthetic cannabis, the district court had authority to revoke his 
probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f) regardless of the district court's disposition of the 
probation violation allegation pertaining to his discharge from sex offender treatment. 
Barth's claim that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard with respect to 
this allegation is therefore moot. 
2. Barth's Discharge From Sex Offender Treatment Constituted A Willful 
Probation Violation 
Even if Barth's claim is not moot, it still fails. Even assuming that I.C.R. 33(f) 
divested the district court of its authority to revoke Barth's probation absent the 
finding of a willful violation, Barth cannot show that the district court ultimately erred 
in revoking his probation because there is substantial evidence in the record that 
Barth's discharge from sex offender treatment was based upon willful conduct. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that 
Barth violated his probation by being discharged from sex offender treatment. 
(6/24/14 Tr., p.60, L.14 - p.64, L.10.) The court did not expressly determine whether 
or not the violation was willful. Instead, the district court cited Lafferty and stated 
that the "willfulness question" would "come[] into play" in the context of its 
subsequent determinations regarding whether Barth's probation should be revoked, 
and, if probation was revoked, what sentence should be entered. (6/24/14 Tr., p.64, 
L.17 - p.66, L.12.) While the district court deferred its willfulness determination, it 
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did conclude that Barth was discharged from treatment because of his misconduct. 
(6/24/14 , p.63, L.8 - p.64, 8.) 
At the subsequent disposition hearing, the district court did not expressly 
revisit the "willfulness question," or expressly apply the standard from either Lafferty 
or 1.C.R. 33(f). (See generally 10/7/14 Tr.) Instead, the district court elected to 
revoke Barth's probation due to Barth's repeated failures to succeed on probation in 
various different housing and treatment placements. (10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.10 - p.1O2, 
L.7.) There is no indication in the record that that the district court ultimately applied 
the Lafferty standard, determined that Barth's discharge from treatment was not 
willful, but then revoked probation anyway. 
To the contrary, substantial evidence in the record indicates that the violation 
was willful. At the evidentiary hearing, Barth's probation officer testified that the sex 
offender treatment provider discharged Barth from treatment. (6/24/14 Tr., p.18, 
L.18 - p.20, L.5.) The state submitted a March 2014 letter from Barth's treatment 
provider which stated: 
Please accept this letter as notification that I am discharging Mr. Barth 
from sexual offender treatment, effective immediately. I have come to the 
decision to do so after contemplation of his reported ongoing difficulties in 
maintaining his boundaries with staff at Rigby Country Living and other 
persons wherein he continues to antagonize or otherwise engage in 
inappropriate hugging, touching, etc. I am aware of multiple staff 
disciplinary actions at the above mentioned facility stemming from Mr. 
Barth's behavior, as well as multiple police responses to the facility 
relative to Mr. Barth's behavior. It is my expectation as a condition of 
treatment, that offenders will maintain appropriate social behavior and 
boundaries as well as comply with all probation conditions. I have met 
with him on four occasions since beginning January 30th to the present 
time. Our sessions have largely been consumed in de-escalating Mr. 
Barth's anger and complaints, and have been relatively unproductive in 
dealing with sexual offender treatment issues. It is my opinion that Mr. 
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Barth is unlikely to benefit from further treatment at this office at this time 
due to his emotional and behavioral limitations. 
(6/24/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-14; PSI, p.6.) 
While subsequent materials submitted by Barth in support of his disposition 
argument indicated that Barth's "emotional and behavioral" issues played a role in 
his discharge from treatment (PSI, pp.7-8), those materials were not inconsistent 
with the March 2014 letter submitted by the state, and together, these documents 
provided substantial evidence that it was Barth's disciplinary issues and misconduct 
which ultimately led to his discharge. The fact that Barth's willful misconduct may 
have arose from his neurological issues is not ultimately relevant to the question of 
whether he willfully violated his probation. Thus, even assuming that 1.C.R. 33(f) 
divested the district court of its authority to revoke Barth's probation absent the 
finding of a willful violation, Barth has failed to show error because the record 
demonstrates that his violations were, in fact, willful. 
3. The Court Acted Consistently With Governing Legal Standards In 
Revoking Barth's Probation, Regardless of Whether The Violations 
Were Willful 
As discussed above, I. C.R. 33(f) purports to preclude a district court from its 
authority to revoke a defendant's probation unless it finds that the defendant willfully 
violated a condition of his probation. However, the authority of a trial court to revoke 
probation is also governed by several statutes. Among them, I.C. § 20-222(2) 
provides, in relevant part: 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court 
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or 
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested. 
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation 
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be 
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executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may 
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which 
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction. 
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court may revoke a defendant's 
probation when the defendant has violated "any of the conditions of probation." I.C. 
§ 20-222 (emphasis added). The statute does not contain any requirement that that 
the violation be "willful." Rather, the only limitation on the court's authority to revoke 
probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be a violation of one or more 
conditions of probation. 
Idaho Code §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603 similarly grant trial courts broad 
authority to revoke probation. In fact, pursuant to those statutes, a court's "authority 
to revoke the probation does not even depend upon [a] violation of any of the terms 
or conditions of the order." Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 482, 253 P.2d 794, 798 
(1953), quoted in Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 297, 392 P.2d 552, 554 (1964). 
Idaho Code § 19-2602 authorizes a district court to "issue a bench warrant for the 
rearrest of the defendant" where "it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the 
terms and conditions upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the 
court ... have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court." Further, 
"[w]hen the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of 
probation," Idaho Code§ 19-2603 provides that the court "may, if judgment has been 
withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if 
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation." 
Consistent with the plain language of I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222, 
Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that the trial courts of this state have 
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statutory authority to revoke probation in two circumstances: "(1) [upon] satisfactory 
proof of a violation of a probation condition, or (2) [for] 'any other cause satisfactory 
to court." State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (citing I.C. 
§§ 19-2602 and 20-222), quoted in State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 326, 824 P.2d 899, 
900 (Ct. App. 1991 ); see also Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554; Ex pa rte 
Medley, 73 Idaho at 482, 253 P.2d at 798-99; State v. Hancock,111 Idaho 835, 727 
P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1986). It is true that Idaho's appellate courts have held that a 
trial court must consider alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant's 
probation based on a violation that is "not willful, or was beyond the probationer's 
control." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37. However, nothing in the 
relevant statutes actually prevents a trial court from revoking probation where the 
violation or other "cause satisfactory to the court" was not willful. 
As discussed above, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a 
district court of its authority to revoke a defendant's probation unless it finds that the 
defendant willfully violated a condition of his probation. The requirement is of no 
effect, however, because it directly conflicts with the broad authority to revoke 
probation granted by I.C. §§ 19-2602, 9-2603 and 20-222, and because a court's 
authority to revoke probation is a matter of substantive, not procedural, law. 
"When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no 
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way 
that results in a conflict." State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706, 709, 228 P.3d 387, 
390 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 
(2008)). However, in this case, it simply is not possible to reasonably interpret I.C.R. 
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33(f) in a way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222. 
Pursuant to the rule, a trial court "shall not revoke probation unless ... the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 33(f). The statutes, on the other 
hand, give the court broad authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of 
"any" of the probation conditions or "for any other cause satisfactory to the court." 
I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 20-222. 
Because it is not possible to reconcile the rule and the statutes, "this Court 
must determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance." 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; see also State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 
539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 
391. "Substantive law issues are the province of the legislature, while matters of 
rulemaking and procedure are generally the province of the judiciary." Two Jinn, 148 
Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390 (citing Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; 
State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 77 4 (1975)). Thus, if the conflict 
between a statute and a criminal rule relates to matters of procedure, the criminal 
rule will prevail. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (citing State v. Beam, 
121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992)); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 
P.3d at 390. "Conversely, in matters of substantive law, the statute applies." Two 
Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709-10, 228 P.3d at 390-91 (citing Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828 
P.2d at 893). 
In determining whether a conflict relates to matters of substantive law or, 
instead, to matters of procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the 
following general guidelines: 
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Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and 
punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, 
and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and 
procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of 
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are 
effectuated. 
Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 67 4, 
676-77 (Wash. 1974)); accord Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93; 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 710,228 P.3d at 
391. 
Applying these guidelines in Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court determined 
that any conflict between I.C.R. 7(b) - which requires a charging document to allege 
the "essential facts constituting the offense charged" - and I.C. § 19-1430 - which 
abolished the distinction between accessories and principals such that "no other 
facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required 
in an indictment against his principal" - was a matter of substantive law. Johnson, 
145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. Specifically, the Court explained: 
The Legislature's definition of principal and abolishment of the 
distinction between principal and accessories does not pertain 
to mechanical operations of the courts; the Legislature is 
creating, defining, and regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. § 
19-1430 is substantive and does not overlap with this Court's 
power to create procedural rules. Therefore, even if I. C. § 19-
1430 and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would prevail. 
Johnson,145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. 
Similarly, in Beam, the Court held that a statute requiring a defendant in a 
death penalty case to file a challenge to his or sentence within 42 days prevailed 
over I.C.R. 35, which permits a challenge to an illegal sentence at any time. Beam, 
121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893. The Court reasoned that, given the unique 
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nature of the death penalty, the statute "creates, defines, and regulates a primary 
rights" and, as such, was a matter of substantive law. l!t 
Like the statutes at issue in Johnson and Beam, the statutes granting trial 
courts authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any of the conditions 
of probation or "for any other cause satisfactory to the court" are substantive in 
nature. It is well settled that probation, itself, "is not a matter of right; it may be 
granted the defendant through exercise of sound discretion by the trial court within 
the ambit of authority conferred by the legislature." Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 
P.2d at 554. Because a trial court's power to place a defendant on probation only 
exists as a function of the legislature's power to enact substantive law, it follows that 
a court's authority to revoke probation is likewise a matter exclusively within the 
province of the legislature. See kl at 300-301, 392 P.2d at 557 (citations omitted) 
("The legislatures of the several states have the exclusive and inherent power to 
define, prohibit and punish any act as a crime within the limits of the federal and 
respective state constitutions."). Indeed, a review of Idaho Code §§ 19-2602, 19-
2603 and 20-222 shows they do not merely prescribe the mechanical procedure a 
court must follow in revoking probation. Instead, they actually define and regulate 
the circumstances under which a legislatively authorized grant of probation may be 
revoked. 
Because the authority of a court to revoke probation is a matter of substantive 
law, the statutes granting the trial courts of this state that authority must '"be given 
due deference and respect," Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (quoting !n 
re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995)). 
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Accordingly, to the extent I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest trial courts of the authority 
granted to them by the legislature to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of 
any probation condition or for "any other cause satisfactory to the court," the rule is 
of no effect. In light of Barth's violation of express conditions of his probation, the 
district court had authority under I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 to revoke 
Bath's probation, regardless of whether the violations were willful. 
D. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declining To Reinstate 
Barth On Probation And Into The Custody Of The Proposed Treatment and 
Housing Program 
Barth contends that the district court erred because, he asserts, it was not 
aware that it had the discretion to tailor the terms of probation to Barth's individual 
needs. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-22.) Barth has failed to demonstrate that the district 
court abused its discretion. 
At the disposition hearing, Barth's counsel acknowledged that, based upon 
the relevant evaluations and Barth's struggles on probation to that point, Barth was 
"not going to make it in group treatment." (10/7/14 Tr., p.79, Ls.3-16.) Therefore, 
through the testimony of treatment provider Ebony Jorgensen, Barth proposed an 
alternative treatment and housing arrangement in which Barth would reside in a two-
bedroom home with one other resident, and would follow a "service plan" with the 
assistance of a single staff member in a one-on-one environment. (10/7/14 Tr., p.31, 
L.19 - p.37, L.4.) 
The district court declined to place Barth on probation and into the custody of 
this proposed program. (10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.10 - p.102, L.7.) Before making this 
determination, the district court reviewed the relevant evaluations and other 
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evidence. (10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.22 - p.94, L.5.) The court summarized the course of 
proceedings and Barth's repeated failures to succeed in various housing and 
treatment programs made available to him to that point. (10/7/14 Tr., p.96, L.17 -
p.98, L.9.) 
With respect to the proposed one-on-on treatment plan, the district court did 
not indicate that it believed it lacked the discretion to reinstate Barth on probation 
into the custody of the proposed program. Instead, the court expressed a belief that 
such a placement would not ultimately be effective, and was contrary to broader 
goals of probation and community supervision. The court explained: 
You are, if on probation, placed in a system that is there to manage 
public safety, provide and hopefully obtain rehabilitation, and all the same 
while helping you hopefully to become somewhat of a better person. But I 
can't, and I don't -- I can't strap the jail, I can't strap probation and parole, 
with some type of a notion that they have to do an individual plan for you 
while supervising you on probation. You have a set of rules; you either 
follow or you don't. You either show up to your meetings or you don't. 
You engage in treatment, or you don't. 
It's a sex offense where you have been given two shots at probation. It's a 
sex offense where you failed your last effort at counseling, not group but 
one-on-one, with Blair Gardner. I found that as a matter of law in the last 
hearing, where we had the evidentiary. And so to now think, well, but let's 
try something else, not in a group, because you can't do that, but let's try 
some more one-on-one, and not with a bunch of people, because you 
don't like that, and pretty soon, it becomes that you want to make the 
probation fit your needs or fit your desires, where it's not really designed to 
do that. 
Probations are designed to say, you can go to prison, or you can go 
and compete these rules and keep them and monitor them. 
(10/7/14 Tr., p.96, Ls.4-16; p.98, L.22- p.99, L.15.) 
20 
Essentially, it appears that the court was concerned that continuing to 
narrowly tailor Barth's probation to his own specific needs and preferences in light of 
Barth's repeated failures to comply with previous probation conditions defeated the 
very purpose of probation. In other words, if a defendant is only capable of 
succeeding on probation if he can choose his own probationary terms, then he is not 
truly a candidate for a probation that will prepare him to live safely within the 
community. 
The district court was not required to place Barth on probation and into the 
custody of the proposed housing and treatment program just because this option 
was presented to it. Instead, the court was entitled to utilize its discretion to consider 
all of the evidence before it, including Barth's prior history on probation, and to 
evaluate the proposed program and determine whether Barth's enrollment in it would 
ultimately achieve the goals of rehabilitation, and was consistent with the protection 
of society. 
On appeal, Barth cites Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 315, 658 P.2d 983, 
986 (Ct. App. 1983), which holds that "the [sentencing] process must, therefore, be 
an individual consideration of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
offense." (Appellant's brief, p.21.) In this case, there is no indication that the district 
court refused to consider Barth's individual facts or circumstances. To the contrary, 
through Barth's various housing and treatment placements, evaluations, and 
reinstatement on probation after a previous violation, the district court was clearly 
well-aware of Barth's individual circumstances, and was willing to attempt to identify 
a probation scenario within which Barth could succeed. At the disposition hearing, 
21 
the court summarized, "I have on a more individualized basis, I think than most, tried 
to extend to you the efforts of working with you, with your individual needs and 
circumstances. In fact, I think to be fair to the state, they were on board with this up 
until this latest violation." (10/7/14 Tr. p.97, L.25 - p.98, L.6.) 
Barth has failed to demonstrate that the district court's decision not to 
reinstate him on probation and into the custody of the proposed housing and 
treatment program constituted an abuse of discretion. This Court should therefore 
affirm the district court's order revoking probation and ordering the original sentence 
executed. 
11. 
Barth Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His I.C.R. 35 
Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Barth contends that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for 
reduction of sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) A review of the record reveals 
that the district court acted well within its discretion in declining to place Barth back 
on probation, or to otherwise reduce his sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and 
the Court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838,840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Barth 
must show that the sentence imposed upon revocation of his probation was 
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"excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the 
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." kl 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion By Denying 
Barth's I.C.R. 35 Motion 
Approximately two weeks after the district court entered its order revoking 
Barth's probation, Barth filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R, 
pp.258-278.) Attached to the motion was a document entitled "Safer Options 
Manual: A Road Map to Treatment and Community Safety." (R., pp.262-278.) The 
document described a treatment program designed for offenders with intellectual 
disabilities and problematic sexual behavior. (Id.) In the motion, Barth asserted that 
the described programming would be made available to him should the district court 
reinstate him on probation and into the custody of the housing and treatment 
program proposed at the disposition hearing. (R., p.259.) 
The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.279-282.) The court noted that 
it had already declined to place Barth into the custody of a program "closely 
resembling the program now presented to the court," and that the submitted 
information regarding the new programing "[did] not change the court's decision 
regarding the defendant's disposition." (R., pp.281-282.) 
Barth has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 
The information attached to the I.C.R. 35 motion merely supplemented the testimony 
presented in support of the housing and treatment program proposed by Barth at the 
disposition hearing. Nothing contained within these documents required the district 
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court to change its decision not to reinstate Barth on probation. This Court should 
therefore affirm the district court's order denying the motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
revoking probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon Barth's 
conviction for felony injury to child, and also affirm the district court's order denying 
Barth's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2015. 
MARK W. OLSON ~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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